2 hours ago
Friday, July 10, 2009
Class Assignment
Read this essay by Paul Collier and the various responses to it provided by the Boston Review. Discuss the implications for policy for the Congo.
Link Dump
Radio Okapi says that the LRA kidnapped 80 Congolese from the village of Bayule, in Congo's northeastern Bas-Uele district, in the early hours of Tuesday morning (7/7), and were heading toward Ango.
Monuc is denouncing the decision by mai-mai groups to ally with the FDLR. The two groups are the Alliance des patriots pour un Congo libre et démocratique (APCLS) and les Patriotes résistants Congolais (PARECO), which are active in Nyabiondo, south of Lubero in North Kivu.
Everyone's happy that Congo and Rwanda have exchanged ambassadors.
IRIN reports the situation continues to worsen for civilians in the Kivus. Some 80,000 people were displaced from their homes in North Kivu in June, and 17,000 were displaced in South Kivu. According to OCHA, "Insecurity resulting from [Kimia II] has reduced humanitarian access and prevented aid organisations reaching thousands of vulnerable people."
The ICRC adds its voice to the many others warning of increasing danger to civilians in North and South Kivu. Rape, murder, pillage, and destruction are causing tens of thousands to flee, particularly in Lubero, Walkale, Rutshuru, and Masisi. It estimates that some 300,000 people have been displaced in North Kivu since the start of the year.
According to a recent independent study sponsored by the ICRC, 76 percent of Congolese have been affected in one way or another by the war; 58 percent have been displaced; 47 percent have lost someone close to them; and 28 percent know someone who was a victim of sexual violence. This is for the Congo as a whole, not just for the Kivus.
Monuc is denouncing the decision by mai-mai groups to ally with the FDLR. The two groups are the Alliance des patriots pour un Congo libre et démocratique (APCLS) and les Patriotes résistants Congolais (PARECO), which are active in Nyabiondo, south of Lubero in North Kivu.
Everyone's happy that Congo and Rwanda have exchanged ambassadors.
IRIN reports the situation continues to worsen for civilians in the Kivus. Some 80,000 people were displaced from their homes in North Kivu in June, and 17,000 were displaced in South Kivu. According to OCHA, "Insecurity resulting from [Kimia II] has reduced humanitarian access and prevented aid organisations reaching thousands of vulnerable people."
The ICRC adds its voice to the many others warning of increasing danger to civilians in North and South Kivu. Rape, murder, pillage, and destruction are causing tens of thousands to flee, particularly in Lubero, Walkale, Rutshuru, and Masisi. It estimates that some 300,000 people have been displaced in North Kivu since the start of the year.
According to a recent independent study sponsored by the ICRC, 76 percent of Congolese have been affected in one way or another by the war; 58 percent have been displaced; 47 percent have lost someone close to them; and 28 percent know someone who was a victim of sexual violence. This is for the Congo as a whole, not just for the Kivus.
ICG: Call off Kimia II!
Declaring that Operations Umoja Wetu and Kimia II both failed to root out FDLR militia while further endangering area civilians, the International Crisis Group called for the Congolese military to halt its operations against the FDLR until it develops a more comprehensive strategy for dealing with them. It said the Congolese military should focus on protecting civilians until the Rwandan army and the 3,000 long-promised additional (European?) troops for Monuc are able to take over the hunt against the FDLR.
A few thoughts:
1) The ICG recommends that Rwanda "participate in the planning and implementation of a new FDLR disarmament strategy." I think this is problematic. First, I'm not convinced that Kigali really wants to invest much resources in hunting down the FDLR. I know that over the last decade they've been using the presence of the FDLR in eastern Congo to make all sorts of demands, but it's also true that they never made any serious effort to sweep up the FDLR during that time. Second, I'm not sure how receptive the Congolese will be to the presence of Rwandan soldiers. Their return to Congo could very easily push groups now marginally associated with the FARDC (such as PARECO and various Mai-Mai) into the anti-Rwandan, pro-FDLR camp.
2) In contrast to the recent HRW report, which was harshly critical of Monuc and the Congolese army, the ICG report focuses on recommendations for the future. There are two ways to look at this: on the one hand, the ICG avoids critizing the institutions it feels will need to be part of any long-term solution to the problem. On the other, it sidesteps the question of whether those institutions are capable of being part of the solution, or whether they are just so intrinsically damaged, compromised, or ineffectual that they need to be massively reengineered before they can be called upon to play a constructive role.
3) It is interesting to me that ICG continues to give the "standard" official explanation for the sudden raprochement between Rwanda and Congo. "Their agreement was a significant shift of alliances in the region. In exchange for the removal of Nkunda by Kigali, Kinshasa agreed to a joint military operation against the FDLR on Congolese territory and to give key positions in the political and security institutions of the Kivus to CNDP representatives..."
As readers know, I think the main reason the two governments abandoned their decade-long enmity so suddenly was that they realized they had a lot more money to make together, through this methane gas project, than they did apart. If Kigali really wanted to rid the region of the FDLR, why did they promise they would quit the Congo within a month--and then, more or less, abide by that promise? As ICG notes:
But if Rwanda and the DRC needed to demonstrate that they were no longer adversaries, and if the point of the operation was simply to secure the perimeter of Lake Kivu for the benefit of the methane plant, then the operation was a definite success.
A few thoughts:
1) The ICG recommends that Rwanda "participate in the planning and implementation of a new FDLR disarmament strategy." I think this is problematic. First, I'm not convinced that Kigali really wants to invest much resources in hunting down the FDLR. I know that over the last decade they've been using the presence of the FDLR in eastern Congo to make all sorts of demands, but it's also true that they never made any serious effort to sweep up the FDLR during that time. Second, I'm not sure how receptive the Congolese will be to the presence of Rwandan soldiers. Their return to Congo could very easily push groups now marginally associated with the FARDC (such as PARECO and various Mai-Mai) into the anti-Rwandan, pro-FDLR camp.
2) In contrast to the recent HRW report, which was harshly critical of Monuc and the Congolese army, the ICG report focuses on recommendations for the future. There are two ways to look at this: on the one hand, the ICG avoids critizing the institutions it feels will need to be part of any long-term solution to the problem. On the other, it sidesteps the question of whether those institutions are capable of being part of the solution, or whether they are just so intrinsically damaged, compromised, or ineffectual that they need to be massively reengineered before they can be called upon to play a constructive role.
3) It is interesting to me that ICG continues to give the "standard" official explanation for the sudden raprochement between Rwanda and Congo. "Their agreement was a significant shift of alliances in the region. In exchange for the removal of Nkunda by Kigali, Kinshasa agreed to a joint military operation against the FDLR on Congolese territory and to give key positions in the political and security institutions of the Kivus to CNDP representatives..."
As readers know, I think the main reason the two governments abandoned their decade-long enmity so suddenly was that they realized they had a lot more money to make together, through this methane gas project, than they did apart. If Kigali really wanted to rid the region of the FDLR, why did they promise they would quit the Congo within a month--and then, more or less, abide by that promise? As ICG notes:
Some speculate that Rwanda abandoned the operation out of concern for the political difficulties it was posing for Kabila. I'm not sure Kigali is known for such solicitude.After 35 days, the results of the operation were much more modest than
officially celebrated. The FDLR was only marginally and temporarily weakened in
North Kivu and remained intact in South Kivu. Less than 500 FDLR combatants
surrendered to MONUC to be demobilised in the first three months of 2009. Barely
a month after the end of the operation, the rebels had regrouped and started to
retaliate against civilians they believed had collaborated with “Umoja Wetu”.
But if Rwanda and the DRC needed to demonstrate that they were no longer adversaries, and if the point of the operation was simply to secure the perimeter of Lake Kivu for the benefit of the methane plant, then the operation was a definite success.
Sunday, July 5, 2009
The Emperor in his Homeland
G. Pascal Zachary writes incisively in the Guardian on Obama's upcoming visit to Ghana:
Obama's visit, while heavy on symbolism, also reveals the limits of his power. Burdened by economic problems in America and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, he can't act boldly in Africa or make big promises.
Indeed, six months into his presidency, he has already undercut expectations. He has approached with great caution the task of settling the region's violent conflicts – in Darfur, eastern Congo, and Somalia. He has also kept a safe distance from Africa's political failures, notably in Zimbabwe, where he has resisted calls to assist in the removal of Robert Mugabe.
Obama's caution is reasonable. He doesn't want to be pigeon-holed, after all, as "the president of Africa". But, in choosing restraint over intervention, he has disappointed ordinary Africans and international activists alike.
The Minerals Are the Problem—Can They also Be the Solution?
I wrote a longish paper in mid-June on two contending reports by Enough and Resource Consulting Services. In the interests of busy readers who might have been put off by the sight of so much type on the screen, I present this summary of that earlier paper.
The contest to control the mineral wealth of eastern Congo is behind much of the fighting that has ravaged that land over the past decade. But can a focus on minerals help bring about a resolution to the wars? In this paper, I argued that Enough, an American advocacy organization, and Resource Consulting Services, a British research firm, rightfully place minerals at the center of the conflict but don’t make the case that either restricting or engaging with the mineral trade is likely to help in the war’s resolution. Instead, I argued, what’s needed is a strong, legitimate state, capable of enforcing order and providing an environment in which legitimate differences can be resolved without recourse to violence. With the Congolese government neither capable nor interested in performing these duties, that leaves the international community, in the form of Monuc, as the sole possible guarantor of the lives of the people of eastern Congo. I recommended that Monuc be greatly expanded and strengthened, so that it is able of taking on this assignment.
I began by observing that considerable confusion exists about what Enough is calling for. Its public statements emphatically draw a link between minerals, war, and the most appalling consequence of the war: the ongoing level of sexual violence against women. But its main recommendation—that electronic companies monitor their supply chain more carefully, but not boycott Congolese minerals—seems either incoherent or too narrow to have much impact. I tried to imagine how to reconcile the gap between public advocacy and responsible policy recommendation:
By contrast, RCS believes that the state in eastern Congo can be reconstituted by bringing regional stakeholders together in a broad-based, bottom-up effort to rebuild the economy on a more sustainable and equitable basis. I argue that the interests of these stakeholders are too kaleidoscopic and contradictory for that to be viable. In any case, the essentially predatory and patrimonial nature of the Congolese state makes it uninspiring model to emulate.
In placing minerals at the center of the conflict, these organizations follow an intellectual path laid out by Paul Collier, a World Bank economist, who argued that the likelihood of a civil war in any given African country depends on the feasibility of rebellion. In his concise formulation, greed, not grievance, lies at the heart of most African conflicts today.
This interpretation, I argued, stands in contrast to the view of such observers as the International Crisis Group and the New Yorker’s Philip Gourevitch, who have blamed the wars on the continuing presence of ex-genocidaires in eastern Congo. (The ICG in a more nuanced fashion than Gourevitch, whose reportage largely consists of transcribing his interviews with Rwandan president Paul Kagame.) In this “spillover” view, Rwanda’s repeated incursions into eastern Congo, which have left it in as Hobbesian and chaotic a state as any place on earth, were justified by the existential threat the ex-genocidaires posed to the current, post-genocidal Rwandan government.
I pointed out that during the Rwandan–spearheaded overthrow of Mobutu in 1996-97, the Rwandan army hunted down and exterminated tens of thousands of ex-genocidaires, their kin, and innocent Hutu non-combatants. But after that, Rwanda seemed to lose interest in chasing down the remaining ex-genocidaires. According to authoritative UN reports, from 1998 to 2003, during Rwanda’s quasi-official occupation of eastern Congo, the Rwandan army rarely engaged its former enemies in combat, and sometimes even collaborated with them on mining operations. At other times, it fought its allies for control of the minerals:
And yet neither Enough nor RCS convinced me that the Congo’s terrible curse, its mineral wealth, can be successfully “instrumentalized” for peace. Collier’s observation that the incidence of civil war reflects the feasibility of rebellion led many of us to foreground the mineral trade. But while resources may make rebellions feasible, it is weak states that make them possible. And that, ultimately, is where the problem lies.
Nicholas Garrett, one of RCS's researchers,wrote to me that the “the Congolese state will remain ineffective if the international community shies away from developmentally effective engagement.” I think this formulation gets it backwards. Some eight years after Kabila junior took power, the Congo remains a dysfunctional mess, incapable of the minimal functions of a state. It can’t gather, account for, or expend the taxes it collects; it’s failed to provide social services for its citizens; and it’s done nothing constructive to improve the country’s infrastructure. Above all, it’s proven utterly incapable of defending its borders or fielding an army willing to take on the enemy rather than its own defenseless citizens.
That leaves the international community. It already has a substantial presence in eastern Congo in the form of the 18,000 MONUC troops. The total bill for maintaining those troops exceeds one billion dollars a year, of which the United States contributes over a quarter. That is a tremendous amount of money, but it is magnitudes less than what the US spends on Iraq or Afghanistan, countries whose main claim on our attention is that they harbored potential enemies. A cynic, I concluded,
The contest to control the mineral wealth of eastern Congo is behind much of the fighting that has ravaged that land over the past decade. But can a focus on minerals help bring about a resolution to the wars? In this paper, I argued that Enough, an American advocacy organization, and Resource Consulting Services, a British research firm, rightfully place minerals at the center of the conflict but don’t make the case that either restricting or engaging with the mineral trade is likely to help in the war’s resolution. Instead, I argued, what’s needed is a strong, legitimate state, capable of enforcing order and providing an environment in which legitimate differences can be resolved without recourse to violence. With the Congolese government neither capable nor interested in performing these duties, that leaves the international community, in the form of Monuc, as the sole possible guarantor of the lives of the people of eastern Congo. I recommended that Monuc be greatly expanded and strengthened, so that it is able of taking on this assignment.
I began by observing that considerable confusion exists about what Enough is calling for. Its public statements emphatically draw a link between minerals, war, and the most appalling consequence of the war: the ongoing level of sexual violence against women. But its main recommendation—that electronic companies monitor their supply chain more carefully, but not boycott Congolese minerals—seems either incoherent or too narrow to have much impact. I tried to imagine how to reconcile the gap between public advocacy and responsible policy recommendation:
What do we want? Greater transparency in the supply chain linking the minerals produced in eastern Congo to consumer electronic companies! When do we want it? At some point in the future, provided that the transparency we seek doesn’t have the inadvertent effect of dampening demand for Congolese minerals or contributing to the further immiseration of Congolese miners!In the end, I was left wondering if Enough would have made consumer electronics their principal focus had they found more promising ways of galvanizing public indignation and channeling that concern into productive political action.
By contrast, RCS believes that the state in eastern Congo can be reconstituted by bringing regional stakeholders together in a broad-based, bottom-up effort to rebuild the economy on a more sustainable and equitable basis. I argue that the interests of these stakeholders are too kaleidoscopic and contradictory for that to be viable. In any case, the essentially predatory and patrimonial nature of the Congolese state makes it uninspiring model to emulate.
In placing minerals at the center of the conflict, these organizations follow an intellectual path laid out by Paul Collier, a World Bank economist, who argued that the likelihood of a civil war in any given African country depends on the feasibility of rebellion. In his concise formulation, greed, not grievance, lies at the heart of most African conflicts today.
This interpretation, I argued, stands in contrast to the view of such observers as the International Crisis Group and the New Yorker’s Philip Gourevitch, who have blamed the wars on the continuing presence of ex-genocidaires in eastern Congo. (The ICG in a more nuanced fashion than Gourevitch, whose reportage largely consists of transcribing his interviews with Rwandan president Paul Kagame.) In this “spillover” view, Rwanda’s repeated incursions into eastern Congo, which have left it in as Hobbesian and chaotic a state as any place on earth, were justified by the existential threat the ex-genocidaires posed to the current, post-genocidal Rwandan government.
I pointed out that during the Rwandan–spearheaded overthrow of Mobutu in 1996-97, the Rwandan army hunted down and exterminated tens of thousands of ex-genocidaires, their kin, and innocent Hutu non-combatants. But after that, Rwanda seemed to lose interest in chasing down the remaining ex-genocidaires. According to authoritative UN reports, from 1998 to 2003, during Rwanda’s quasi-official occupation of eastern Congo, the Rwandan army rarely engaged its former enemies in combat, and sometimes even collaborated with them on mining operations. At other times, it fought its allies for control of the minerals:
In 2000 and 2001, Rwandan forces waged pitched battles against the Ugandan army for control of gold mines on the outskirts of Kisangani, a river town in north-central Congo. Thousands of Congolese civilians died in the crossfire. Uganda was Rwanda’s erstwhile ally in the war against Kabila, and Kisangani is a thousand kilometers from any population of ex-genocidaires. So it would be as if the United States, having invaded Iraq, started cutting business deals with al Qaeda but killed thousands of Iraqi bystanders in a battle against the British for control of the oil fields of Kirkuk.I have long favored Collier’s theory to the “spillover” metaphor as an explanation for the ongoing conflict in the Congo, so I have been gratified to see the increasing amount of attention paid to minerals by major groups as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Global Witness, as well as by smaller, regional NGOs. Recently, a handful of US senators sponsored a bill that would require U.S. companies to track and disclose the country of origin of minerals used in common electronic products. If the bill passes, companies will face an unpleasant choice: either disclose that they are helping fund militia groups operating in the DRC, or demand that their suppliers purchase minerals from other, presumably more expensive sources.
And yet neither Enough nor RCS convinced me that the Congo’s terrible curse, its mineral wealth, can be successfully “instrumentalized” for peace. Collier’s observation that the incidence of civil war reflects the feasibility of rebellion led many of us to foreground the mineral trade. But while resources may make rebellions feasible, it is weak states that make them possible. And that, ultimately, is where the problem lies.
Nicholas Garrett, one of RCS's researchers,wrote to me that the “the Congolese state will remain ineffective if the international community shies away from developmentally effective engagement.” I think this formulation gets it backwards. Some eight years after Kabila junior took power, the Congo remains a dysfunctional mess, incapable of the minimal functions of a state. It can’t gather, account for, or expend the taxes it collects; it’s failed to provide social services for its citizens; and it’s done nothing constructive to improve the country’s infrastructure. Above all, it’s proven utterly incapable of defending its borders or fielding an army willing to take on the enemy rather than its own defenseless citizens.
That leaves the international community. It already has a substantial presence in eastern Congo in the form of the 18,000 MONUC troops. The total bill for maintaining those troops exceeds one billion dollars a year, of which the United States contributes over a quarter. That is a tremendous amount of money, but it is magnitudes less than what the US spends on Iraq or Afghanistan, countries whose main claim on our attention is that they harbored potential enemies. A cynic, I concluded,
might wonder if Congolese are destined to suffer because their people never hated us enough, despite our having imposed on them a dictator who robbed them blind for thirty years. Surely our historical responsibilities--and the sheer magnitude of their distress--dictate a larger response.
Friday, July 3, 2009
Link Dump
Aryeh Neier, head of Open Society Institute, says that despite dire conditions in the DRC,
Speaking of which, the Missionary International Service News Agency reports that FDLR rebels set at least 30 homes on fire last night in Miriki, in North Kivu. "According to local witnesses, the attack took place in the middle of the night, causing panic among residents that fled into the forest. Miriki, 120km north of the provincial capital Goma, was for long a stronghold of the FDLR that extorted tributes from residents in absence of a security force."
Congratulations to Finbarr O'Reilly for receiving the best photography award from Diageo for his work on artisinal gold mining in the DRC. He was one of several journalists recognized by Diageo for their reporting on African business. Story here.
Is that hope in your pocket or are you just happy to see me? Jenna Dewan and Emmanuelle Chriqui were among the many lovely young things attending a bash at Hollywood's Jane House a few days ago, organized by our friends at Enough. This seems to have had something to do with raising hope for the Congo.
A recent development has provided a rare ray of hope: the extraordinary mobilisation of Congolese civil society in defence of the DRC’s nascent democratic institutions.And yes, this comes from The Namibian, South West Africa's paper of record. CR trawls widely to bring you news you can use!
No fewer than 210 Congolese non-governmental organisations, including those enjoying the widest recognition and respect across the country, recently joined in challenging President Joseph Kabila’s attempt to take control of the National Assembly (the lower house of Parliament) that came into office after historic elections in 2006.
The episode that brought together Congolese civil society was Kabila’s insistence in March on forcing the resignation of Vital Kamerhe, the Speaker of the National Assembly. Kamerhe had antagonised Kabila by criticising his secret deal with President Paul Kagame of Rwanda that resulted in joint military operations earlier in the year against a Rwandan rebel force operating in the DRC.
Speaking of which, the Missionary International Service News Agency reports that FDLR rebels set at least 30 homes on fire last night in Miriki, in North Kivu. "According to local witnesses, the attack took place in the middle of the night, causing panic among residents that fled into the forest. Miriki, 120km north of the provincial capital Goma, was for long a stronghold of the FDLR that extorted tributes from residents in absence of a security force."
Congratulations to Finbarr O'Reilly for receiving the best photography award from Diageo for his work on artisinal gold mining in the DRC. He was one of several journalists recognized by Diageo for their reporting on African business. Story here.
Is that hope in your pocket or are you just happy to see me? Jenna Dewan and Emmanuelle Chriqui were among the many lovely young things attending a bash at Hollywood's Jane House a few days ago, organized by our friends at Enough. This seems to have had something to do with raising hope for the Congo.
Thursday, July 2, 2009
HRW: Army Committing most of the Rapes
One important detail from the new HRW report: "The majority of the rape cases investigated by Human Rights Watch were attributed to soldiers from the Congolese army."
Doss Must Go
Human Rights Watch issued a damning indictment of the UN's military operation in the Kivus today, saying it has been a disaster for the people of the region:
It is time to end this fiasco, confine the Congolese troops to their barracks, and fire Monuc chief Alan Doss. The failure of this operation was foreseeable by any well-informed observer. Indeed, many warned against it, including the Spanish General Vicente Díaz de Villegas, who resigned shortly after his nomination as Monuc force commander once it became apparent what he would be asked to do with the resources available to him. The Congolese army was in no condition to take on a complex counter-insurgency campaign. From the get-go it was obvious they were not only inadequate to the task but a serious threat to local civilians. For their part, Monuc troops are chronically under-equipped and poorly officered. They have never demonstrated any offensive capacity. Their only utility has been to occupy territory previously claimed by militia--and even on that score, their record is mixed.
It was also clear that the ex-genocidaires would retaliate against civilians at the slightest provocation. The 10,000 to 15,000 members of the FDLR active in eastern Congo were remnants of the genocidal regime responsible for the murder of 500,000 to 800,000 Rwandans in the summer of 1994. While only a fraction of them had participated in the genocide--most were children of the 1994 killers--they were led by men with an indisputable record for indiscrimate physical and sexual violence. There was, furthermore, an immediate and cautionary precedent for Kimia II. In December 2008, the US aided an operation by the Ugandan army against Joseph Kony and his small band of followers known as the Lord's Resistance Army in northern Uganda. The operation, known as Lightning Thunder, failed to capture Kony, and the militia fled across the border in small groups that, as the New York Times reported, continued "to ransack town after town in northeastern Congo, hacking, burning, shooting and clubbing to death anyone in their way." The consequences of that operation's failure ought to have raised a big red flag to anyone considering taking action against any militia in the region.
Given that record, it was essential for any operation against the FDLR to be well-prepared and well-executed. If those conditions could not be met, no operation should have been undertaken. Yet it is obvious by now that even the most minimal standards were not in place. To help field an operational Congolese army, Monuc bundled various enemy militias--including one under the command of a war criminal known as the terminator--together with a rag-tag group of poorly trained and rarely paid Congolese soldiers. Then, without any serious training or effort to integrate the forces, it set them loose on a hunt against the one remaining militia in the region, the ex-genocidaires. The results were entirely predictable. To be sure, the Congolese army bears responsibility for the abuses they commit. But Monuc greenlighted the operation, despite knowing exactly what it could expect from the monumentally undisciplined Congolese army. That is why Major General Patrick Cammaert, a former commander for the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC), last week said that recent events in Eastern Congo are "shameful" and "destroy the reputation of the UN and of MONUC."
What is needed now is for the operation to be brought to an end, for Doss and other senior Monuc leaders to be fired, and for an investigation to begin into the decision-making process that led to this disaster.
Then we need to fashion an international response commensurate with the scale of the crisis unfolding in the Congo. The number of Congolese who have died over the last decade as a result of the war is approaching six million. Countless women have been raped. Indeed, rape requiring surgical repair has become the war's signature contribution to the litany of the world's horrors. President Obama, Secretary Clinton, Ambassador Rice: Where are you?
*The origin of the name remains a mystery, at least to me. Georgianne Nienaber says that Kimia means peace in the local Lingala dialect, although Lingala is neither local nor a dialect. But Eve Ensler says it comes from the Swahili expression for shushing someone. A 1996 report from Amnesty agrees it means silence--but in Lingala. (Swahili is common in the east, Lingala in the West.) Interestingly, the first Operation Kimia in 1996 was also an attempt by the Congolese (then Zairian) army to quell uprisings in the Kivus. It too was characterized by large-scale human rights abuses committed by often unpaid soldiers, and it too ended in failure.
United Nations-backed Congolese armed forces conducting intensified military operations in eastern and northern Democratic Republic of Congo have failed to protect civilians from brutal rebel retaliatory attacks and instead are themselves attacking and raping Congolese civilians, Human Rights Watch said today. The attacks on civilians from all sides have resulted in a significant increase in human rights violations over the past six months.Human Rights Watch joins a growing chorus of organizations, including Amnesty International, Oxfam, Enough Project, and the International Crisis Group, in detailing the massive failures of the operation, known as Kimia II.*
It is time to end this fiasco, confine the Congolese troops to their barracks, and fire Monuc chief Alan Doss. The failure of this operation was foreseeable by any well-informed observer. Indeed, many warned against it, including the Spanish General Vicente Díaz de Villegas, who resigned shortly after his nomination as Monuc force commander once it became apparent what he would be asked to do with the resources available to him. The Congolese army was in no condition to take on a complex counter-insurgency campaign. From the get-go it was obvious they were not only inadequate to the task but a serious threat to local civilians. For their part, Monuc troops are chronically under-equipped and poorly officered. They have never demonstrated any offensive capacity. Their only utility has been to occupy territory previously claimed by militia--and even on that score, their record is mixed.
It was also clear that the ex-genocidaires would retaliate against civilians at the slightest provocation. The 10,000 to 15,000 members of the FDLR active in eastern Congo were remnants of the genocidal regime responsible for the murder of 500,000 to 800,000 Rwandans in the summer of 1994. While only a fraction of them had participated in the genocide--most were children of the 1994 killers--they were led by men with an indisputable record for indiscrimate physical and sexual violence. There was, furthermore, an immediate and cautionary precedent for Kimia II. In December 2008, the US aided an operation by the Ugandan army against Joseph Kony and his small band of followers known as the Lord's Resistance Army in northern Uganda. The operation, known as Lightning Thunder, failed to capture Kony, and the militia fled across the border in small groups that, as the New York Times reported, continued "to ransack town after town in northeastern Congo, hacking, burning, shooting and clubbing to death anyone in their way." The consequences of that operation's failure ought to have raised a big red flag to anyone considering taking action against any militia in the region.
Given that record, it was essential for any operation against the FDLR to be well-prepared and well-executed. If those conditions could not be met, no operation should have been undertaken. Yet it is obvious by now that even the most minimal standards were not in place. To help field an operational Congolese army, Monuc bundled various enemy militias--including one under the command of a war criminal known as the terminator--together with a rag-tag group of poorly trained and rarely paid Congolese soldiers. Then, without any serious training or effort to integrate the forces, it set them loose on a hunt against the one remaining militia in the region, the ex-genocidaires. The results were entirely predictable. To be sure, the Congolese army bears responsibility for the abuses they commit. But Monuc greenlighted the operation, despite knowing exactly what it could expect from the monumentally undisciplined Congolese army. That is why Major General Patrick Cammaert, a former commander for the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC), last week said that recent events in Eastern Congo are "shameful" and "destroy the reputation of the UN and of MONUC."
What is needed now is for the operation to be brought to an end, for Doss and other senior Monuc leaders to be fired, and for an investigation to begin into the decision-making process that led to this disaster.
Then we need to fashion an international response commensurate with the scale of the crisis unfolding in the Congo. The number of Congolese who have died over the last decade as a result of the war is approaching six million. Countless women have been raped. Indeed, rape requiring surgical repair has become the war's signature contribution to the litany of the world's horrors. President Obama, Secretary Clinton, Ambassador Rice: Where are you?
*The origin of the name remains a mystery, at least to me. Georgianne Nienaber says that Kimia means peace in the local Lingala dialect, although Lingala is neither local nor a dialect. But Eve Ensler says it comes from the Swahili expression for shushing someone. A 1996 report from Amnesty agrees it means silence--but in Lingala. (Swahili is common in the east, Lingala in the West.) Interestingly, the first Operation Kimia in 1996 was also an attempt by the Congolese (then Zairian) army to quell uprisings in the Kivus. It too was characterized by large-scale human rights abuses committed by often unpaid soldiers, and it too ended in failure.
Wednesday, July 1, 2009
Mapping the Congolese Conflict
From Enough, I learn that Jim McDermott (D-WA) inserted an amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill that would require the U.S. government to develop a map of armed groups and mineral-rich areas of eastern Congo. Mines in areas under the control of armed groups would be designated as ‘conflict zone mines,’ and the map would be updated semi-annually.
In February, I suggested that we train an extended network of educated local people in the Kivus to report on developments in resource management and sexual violence in their area. This sort of crowd-sourcing would keep us abreast of developments in real time, contribute to local capacity building, and enable us to develop a more comprehensive and up-to-date response to crises as they occur. For example, it would speed the ability of Monuc and Fardc to respond to a local outbreak of sexual violence. Ushahidi began such an effort last year, but seems to have abandoned it, perhaps for lack of funding.
I think this would be a much better use of our money than to send expensive expatriate cartographers out every half year to produce maps that--however sophisticated--will be out of date by the time they are published. The internet and the fact that even remote areas of Congo have cell phone access make McDermott's proposal seem antiquarian.
In February, I suggested that we train an extended network of educated local people in the Kivus to report on developments in resource management and sexual violence in their area. This sort of crowd-sourcing would keep us abreast of developments in real time, contribute to local capacity building, and enable us to develop a more comprehensive and up-to-date response to crises as they occur. For example, it would speed the ability of Monuc and Fardc to respond to a local outbreak of sexual violence. Ushahidi began such an effort last year, but seems to have abandoned it, perhaps for lack of funding.
I think this would be a much better use of our money than to send expensive expatriate cartographers out every half year to produce maps that--however sophisticated--will be out of date by the time they are published. The internet and the fact that even remote areas of Congo have cell phone access make McDermott's proposal seem antiquarian.
Fighting off the Vultures
The African Development Bank has launched a legal support organisation designed to level the playing field for cash-strapped African states negotiating complex commercial transactions or facing litigation by vulture funds. Money quote:
The World Bank estimated in 2007 that 38 creditors had won $1bn (€712m, £605m) from lawsuits against countries in its debt relief programme, many of which are African nations. The claims of 10 creditors against Liberia - which was devastated by almost15 years of on-off civil war - amounted to $130m, or almost a fifth of annual gross domestic product.It is hard to get too excited about vulture funds when they attack countries where the elite skim off the country's own wealth. But in a case like Liberia--where the government is making a good faith effort to improve the lives of its citizens--it's very hard not to view the vulture fund managers as anything other than legalized child killers. This is one of those occasions when you wish a group with the militancy of PETA or GreenPeace existed to fight on behalf of the world's poorest people.
Tuesday, June 30, 2009
Where Are they Now?
From the Washington Post, January 5, 2009:
But no one needs to read the tea leaves on one particular aspect of Obama's foreign policy: Obama, Clinton and Vice President-elect Joseph R. Biden Jr. have all called for aggressive American action against humanitarian crises and genocide. Susan E. Rice, Obama's nominee for U.N. ambassador, has said that if a Rwanda-style genocide began again, she "would come down on the side of dramatic action, going down in flames if that was required." Samantha Power, a leading proponent for an interventionist American policy in humanitarian crises, was a senior Obama adviser during the presidential campaign.I am reluctantly coming to the conclusion that Obama is a mainstream politician with little real interest in alleviating chronic, underpublicized humanitarian disasters in far-off lands. It's still early in his administration and I hope I'm wrong. But he's certainly not yet taken any meaningful action on any of Africa's multiple crises. Nor has he shown courage on other issues requiring moral leadership, such as gay rights, civil liberties, the Armenian genocide, and so on. I know: he's got a lot on his plate. No president since Roosevelt has come to office with so many urgent national and international problems to deal with. Still, I am starting to worry that he may turn out to be more like Clinton than Bush, who at least dedicated substantial sums to the AIDS catastrophe.
"Look empirically at the kind of people who will populate the decision-making positions in the new administration and compare them with the principals" in the George W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations, said John Prendergast, co-chairman of the Enough Project, an advocacy group that fights genocide. "What we will get, possibly for the first time in my life, is leadership from the top in these crises."
"I Will Not Kill Myself Today"
An op-ed by Eve Ensler in today's Washington Post says that the UN's passage one year ago of Resolution 1820, which recognized rape as a weapon of war, has done nothing for the women of the DRC. Money quotes:
Over 12 years, in a regional economic war for resources, hundreds of thousands of women and girls have been raped and tortured, their bodies destroyed by unimaginable acts... Anneke Van Woudenberg of Human Rights Watch, just back from the front lines in both North and South Kivu, told me Monday that in nearly all the health centers, hospitals and rape counseling centers she visited, rape cases had doubled or tripled since January...
A few days ago, I sat in a dark shack with 30 survivors of rape. These women had fled their villages after being brutally terrorized and had randomly found each other. They banded together to form a grass-roots group called I Will Not Kill Myself Today. The women of eastern Congo are enduring their 12th year of sexual terrorism. The girl children born of rape are now being raped. What will it take for the United Nations to finally do something meaningful to stop the violence? The women are waiting.
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